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ABSTRACT
Investment of U.S. firms responds asymmetrically to Tobin’s Q: investment of established firms —
‘intensive’ investment — reacts negatively to Q whereas investment of new firms — ‘extensive’
investment — responds positively and elastically to Q. This asymmetry, we argue, reflects a difference
between established and new firms in the cost of adopting new technologies. A fall in the compatibility
of new capital with old capital raises measured Q and reduces the incentive of established firms to
invest. New firms do not face such compatibility costs and step up their investment in response to
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Abstract
Investment of U.S. ﬁrms responds asymmetrically to Tobin’s Q: investment
of established ﬁrms — ‘intensive’ investment — reacts negatively to  whereas
investment of new ﬁrms — ‘extensive’ investment — responds positively and
elastically to . This asymmetry, we argue, reﬂects a diﬀerence between es-
tablished and new ﬁrms in the cost of adopting new technologies. A fall in the
compatibility of new capital with old capital raises measured  and reduces
the incentive of established ﬁrms to invest. New ﬁrms do not face such com-
patibility costs and step up their investment in response to the rise in  The
model ﬁts the data well using aggregates since 1900.
1 Introduction
Extensive and intensive labor supply has been modeled at the individual-worker level
(Cogan 1981) and at the aggregate level (Cho and Cooley 1993, Cho and Rogerson
1998). Extensive labor supply — movement in and out of the labor market — is more
wage elastic than intensive labor supply — the hours of employed workers.
An even starker contrast exists between the response to aggregate Tobin’s  of
extensive investment — capital formation by entering ﬁrms and young ﬁrms — and the
response by intensive investment — capital formation by older ﬁrms and listed ﬁrms.
When aggregate  rises, new ﬁrms and young ﬁrms raise their investment, whereas
older, publicly listed ﬁr m sr e d u c et h e i r s .
To explain the puzzle we use a model in which movements in  are caused by
changes in the cost of capital that aﬀect continuing projects but not new ones. Tech-
nological change raises the cost of making new capital compatible with capital al-
ready in place. Fitting new wiring or new equipment into an old building originally
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1designed for something else is costly. Retraining workers who originally were trained
to do something else is also costly. If the arrival of new technology precedes high-
 periods, then a high  is the result of high costs of adjustment that reﬂect this
incompatibility. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) have a model in this general spirit,
though it is steady-state growth with no variation in .
Gilchrist and Williams (2000) and Campbell (1998) estimate vintage-capital mod-
els closely related to ours. They too assume a distribution of new investment opportu-
nities each period. Once implemented, the capital that the project embodies cannot
be augmented at a later date.1 Our model relaxes this assumption; it allows ﬁrms to
invest in continuing projects and the shock to this intensive investment technology is
of overriding importance. Investment in capital of the latest vintage (new projects)
is estimated to be a small component of the total and is distinguished from invest-
ment in capital of older vintages (continuing projects). Furthermore, this intensive
investment technology is, at any date, equally eﬃcient regardless of the vintage of
the project. Thus, while not a full-blown vintage-capital model, the model we end
up with can be solved by hand.
We interpret the shock to the intensive-investment technology as a cost of mak-
ing new and old capital compatible, or as a cost of adapting old processes to new
technology. Yorukoglu (1998) interprets his investment-cost shock similarly. Our dis-
tinction between extensive investment (in new projects) and intensive investment (in
continuing projects) is also similar to one made by Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti
(2010) between innovation and standardization costs. Similarly, Justiniano, Prim-
iceri, and Tambelotti (forthcoming) distinguish shocks to the supply of capital goods
from shocks to the investment adjustment cost for installed capital, and ﬁnd that the
latter play a large role in explaining ﬂuctuations. Jovanovic (2009) relates the imple-
mentation cost to a depleted stock of investment options. Prusa and Schmitz (1991,
1994) ﬁnd that ﬁrms pursue less radical forms of innovation as they age, presumably
because they face such compatibility, adaptability and standardization costs.
The value of capital in place is determined solely by the cost of intensive invest-
ment and when that cost rises, we see a substitution towards extensive investment
(which is not subject to this shock) and a rise in the stock market and in .T h i s
is the mechanism that explains the asymmetry. Over the cycle, the mechanism has
as m o o t h i n ge ﬀect on investment because the new-project technology is not aﬀected
by the implementation shock that drives aggregate investment.
The model also includes a TFP shock, which is important for explaining other
features of the time series but is not involved in generating the asymmetry. Thus as
in Greenwood, Hercowicz, and Krusell (1997) and Fisher (2006), we have a TFP shock
and a shock to the cost of capital, except that the latter applies only to continuing
projects.
1Bilbiie et al. (2007) in their Sec. 5 brieﬂy extend to allow variable plant size but
d on o ts t u d yt h ei s s u eo fd i ﬀerential elasticity of extensive and intensive investment.
2The model assumes two assets. The ﬁrst is a claim to dividends of the portfolio
of all continuing projects run by incumbent ﬁrms. The second is a private-equity
fund that ﬁnances all new projects and sells them to incumbent ﬁrms or equivalently
as IPOs in the form of new ﬁrms. Earlier versions of this paper assumed that new
projects were developed by incumbents as spin-outs, as in Franco and Filson (2006),
Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and (implicitly) Prescott and Boyd (1987).2
The next section presents the evidence that motivates the paper, and Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 ﬁts the model to the time series of investment —
extensive and intensive — and Section 5 contrasts the model to the standard model
with just one investment. Section 6 relaxes the assumption that continuing projects
are homogeneous. Section 7 concludes.
2 Evidence on Investment and Q
The patterns that we outline above can be seen in both aggregate and sectoral data.
Here we summarize that evidence.
Investment of Compustat ﬁrms is negatively related to aggregate .–Standard
and Poor’s Compustat database consists of public ﬁrms that we generally think of
as incumbents. The investment rates of these listed ﬁrms depend positively on their
own ’s but negatively on aggregate . Figure 1 illustrates this, where the left panel
shows a mildly positive relation between ﬁrm-level investment and ﬁrm-speciﬁc ’s in
a pooled ordinary least squares regression using data from 1962 through 2006.3 This
is consistent with the standard -theory of investment, which suggests that high-
 ﬁrms will have higher desired investment rates than low- ﬁrms. Interestingly,
the right panel shows our new fact that investment rates of the same Compustat
ﬁrms respond negatively to aggregate , with the observations on the horizontal axis
ordered by the unweighted annual averages of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ’s. Tables B.1 and
B.2 in Appendix B show that the relationships in Figure 1 are robust to the inclusion
of ﬁxed eﬀects for years and two-digit standard industry classiﬁcations (SICs), and
to estimation by GMM to control for potential measurement error in .
The same contrast emerges in another set of regressions that use the same Com-
pustat data displayed in Figure 1. Firm ’s investment in year  as a percentage of its
capital stock at the start of the year is denoted by (),a g g r e g a t e is denoted
by  and ﬁrm ’s deviation from it by  − . Once again estimation is by OLS.
2The investment implications do not hinge on the assumed mechanism, but Gom-
pers (2002) shows that IPOs of VC-funded new projects and private sales to ﬁrms of
such projects outweigh IPOs and private sales of spinouts by a factor of eight or nine.
3See Appendix A for descriptions of the sources and methods used to construct all
of the data used in our empirics.














with 2=.01 and 160,580 ﬁrm-level observations. With ﬁxed eﬀects for two-digit SIC
industries, the coeﬃcient for  becomes -0.133, suggesting an even stronger negative
elasticity of investment to aggregate ,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcient for ( − ) falls slightly
to 0.012. Both coeﬃcients remain highly signiﬁcant statistically and the 2 rises to
0.85. Table 1 shows that this negative aggregate -elasticity of investment also holds
for ﬁrms in ﬁve broadly-deﬁned sectors, with the eﬀects of  on investment strongest
for business and industrial ﬁrms and for biotech and healthcare ﬁrms.
Investment by young ﬁrms is positively related to aggregate .–Although all Com-
pustat ﬁrms are what we would call incumbents, the ﬁrms that listed recently are most
likely to exhibit investment behavior similar to that of new ﬁrms. To us, this means
that the investment rates of recent listings could well be positively related to  even
though investment rates of the entire pool of incumbents are negatively related to
. Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case, with columns 1-2 and 5-6 indicating
a strong and positive elasticity of investment to aggregate  for ﬁrms that had been
listed for two years or less and three years or less, respectively. And as we would
expect, the size of the positive coeﬃcient on  is larger for the former (i.e., nar-
rower) deﬁnition of “young” ﬁrms. At the same time, and again as expected, the





        TABLE 1.―INVESTMENT REGRESSIONS FOR FIVE BROADLY-DEFINED SECTORS, 1962-2006 
               
                          Dependent variable: log of investment as a percentage of capital stock at start of year  
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No.  of  observations  30,232 17,564 24,327 34,288 22,498 
 
Notes: Estimation is by OLS with T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable Q j, t-1 is the mean Tobin’s Q 
of all Compustat firms in broadly-defined sector j at the end of the previous year. The independent variable Q i, t-1 – Q j, t-1 is the difference between 
the individual firm’s Q i and its broad sectoral average, Q j. The broadly-defined sectors are the same as those used in Gompers et al. (2008). They 
aggregate the 69 sectors defined by Thomson Venture Economics into nine broader sectors, including the five that we consider here. We then assign 
Compustat firms to these broad sectors using a mapping from three-digit SIC industries provided by Anna Kovner. The mapping is not exclusive, as 
a given three-digit SIC code can be associated with more than one broadly-defined sector. Thus, some three-digit SIC codes and their associated 
firms appear in more than one of the sectoral regressions above. Table B.3 in Appendix B provides details of the mapping. Our regressions with 








TABLE 2.―INVESTMENT REGRESSIONS FOR YEARS SINCE COMPUSTAT LISTING, 1962-2006 
 
                                       Dependent variable: log of investment as percentage of capital stock at start of year
          
                                      
Years since listing  ≤ 2 years   > 2 years  ≤ 3 years          > 3 years 
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1.  Estimation is by OLS with T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
2.   The independent variable Q, t-1 is the mean Tobin’s Q of all Compustat firms at the end of the previous 
year. 
 
3.  The independent variable Q i, t-1 – Q t-1 is the difference between the individual firm’s Q i and the 
aggregate average Q.  
 deeply negative aggregate -elasticity than the entire set of Compustat ﬁrms.
Venture capital ﬂows into young ﬁrms.–A systematic source of micro evidence on
entering ﬁr m si sT h o m s o n ’ sVentureXpert sample of venture-backed ﬁrms. Venture
capitalists (VCs) invest almost exclusively in start-up ﬁrms. One cannot compute a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc  for these ﬁrms, but one can use the  that prevails for listed ﬁrms
in particular sectors. Gompers et al. (2008, Table 4-5, pp. 11-12) show that VC
investments have responded elastically to  for their sector using annual data from
1975 to 1998. In particular, OLS regressions of the annual number of investments
in each of 69 VentureXpert sectors on one-year lags of their average sectoral ’s
(computed as market-to-book ratios from Compustat) deliver a coeﬃcient on  of
0.330 in a speciﬁcation without year or industry ﬁxed eﬀects and a coeﬃcient of 0.172
with year and industry eﬀects included. They also obtain a coeﬃcient on  of 0.043
when regressing ﬁrm-level investment on sectoral ’s with ﬁxed eﬀects for industries
and years. Thus they ﬁnd a strong positive response by VC-backed ﬁrms to sector-
speciﬁc s in same sectors for which our Table 1 documents a signiﬁcant negative
response by the Compustat ﬁrms.
In sum, aggregate data as well as micro evidence from Compustat and VenturXpert
show a clear asymmetry in the response of investment to changes in aggregate .
Entering and young ﬁrms respond positively, while older ﬁrms respond negatively to
changes in aggregate . We now present a model that explains the phenomenon.
3M o d e l
The output of the ﬁnal good depends on capital, , and on a technology shock :
output = 
The law of motion for capital is

0 =( 1− ) +  +  (1)
where  represents capital produced in continuing projects, and  is capital produced
in new projects.
() Continuing projects.–Continuing projects can be enlarged at the gross rate of
return of 1, which is the same over all continuing projects. That is, an investment
today of  units of the consumption good in an existing project yields one unit of
new capital. Then if the capital created via existing projects is ,t h et o t a lc o s ti s
.
() New projects.–A project uses as inputs a unit of the consumption good and
an idea. As output it delivers  units of capital in the following period. The quality,
, of the project is known at the start. New projects are born each period, and
their quality is distributed with a C.D.F. () with density ().I d e a s a r r i v e i n
7proportion to the size of the capital stock. Thus the unnormalized distribution of
new ideas is (). Ideas cannot be stored. Idea quality is evaluated privately by
venture funds — an agent does not know the  of his own idea.
We pause to note two diﬀerences in how investment in new and old projects is
treated.
Contracting between agents and venture funds.–All ideas are submitted to venture
funds for evaluation. A fund pays the idea’s owner only if it uses the idea to ﬂoat
an IPO or sells the capital privately to an incumbent ﬁrm, either way receiving the
price of  per unit. There are no long-term contracts, and contracts cannot condition
on .4 U pf r o n tp a y m e n t sb yt h ev e n t u r ef u n dc a n n o tb em a d eb e c a u s ea n y o n ec o u l d
pretend to have an idea and collect the payment. Ex post, payment cannot be made
conditional on  because the fund would always claim that the idea was of the lowest
quality acceptable. Therefore the fund pays the minimum that it takes to get the
idea owner to develop the project, and that payment is unity. Since the fund knows





so that m is the quality of the marginal project. The fund sells the projects to the
public at the price of  per unit (this is explained further below) and collects revenue















and proﬁts are paid out as dividends to the households that own the funds.
Income identity.–Let  = ,a n d =  Output is divided between con-
sumption and the two forms of investment so that the income identity reads
 =  − − () (5)









i st h ec o s to ft h en e wp r o j e c t sa n d is the cost of the continuing projects, with each
4This is a bit unrealistic because a ﬁrm’s founder at IPO often does have a con-

















Figure 2: The determination of investment.
term in (5) measured per unit of . Moreover, (2) and (6) imply that the marginal
costs of capital entailed in the two investment margins are equal:5

0 ()= (7)
The determination of investment.–Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect of a rise in  when
 is held constant. Investment, , equals savings which are determined by households’
savings decisions (to be described presently). The households’ demand for investment
is negatively sloped because a rise in  r a i s e st h ec o s to ff u t u r ec o n s u m p t i o na n d
reduces the demand for it (see (11)). The investment rate (i.e., supply) of entering
capital is determined by (7) and increasing in ; this is the positively-sloped function
in Figure (2). Incumbent investment takes up the slack between the demand for 
and the supply of .A s  rises, two things happen: ﬁrst, savings decline so that 
falls from 1 to 2; second, the supply of entrants rises from 1 to 2.T h e r e f o r e falls
by more than .6 As  rises, on the other hand, the downward-sloping savings curve
in Figure 2 shifts to the right (see (11). This causes both  and  to rise.
5This is because 0 ()=− (m)m and m =1 m(m)
6These implications remain valid under a more general speciﬁcation: rewrite (5)
as  =  −  − ().T h u s  raises the costs of incumbents but not that of entrants.
Suppose, instead, that the resource constraint were  =  −  − () with  6=0 .
Then instead of (7) the FOC would be 0 ()=1− and the conclusions illustrated
in Figure 2 would remain qualitatively intact so long as 1.T h a ti s ,  would be











Let  ≡ () be the state, assumed i.i.d. with distribution  (). Contemporane-
ously,  and  may be correlated. The i.i.d. assumption lets us solve explicitly and
discuss results intuitively, but simulations reported in earlier versions of the paper
(e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau 2009) show that the results are largely unchanged if 
follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process.
The state of the economy is (), but since returns are constant and preferences
homothetic,  aﬀects neither interest rates nor investment rates.
The equilibrium price of capital.–We shall assume that, as in Figure 2, the size
of entering ideas is too small to aﬀect today’s market price  of the marginal unit of
capital. A price higher than  would draw forth an investment level  that is larger
than the supply of savings on the part of households. Moreover, since the quality, ,
of each new project is public knowledge ex ante, the shares of such an entering ﬁrm
will sell at a price of  where established ﬁrms bid for the capital to the point at
which its value equals its cost.
Assets.–The household may own two assets:
() Private equity.–The price is () per share in the private-equity fund, and
a share pays dividend (). The fund manages only new projects and sells them
right away, and beneﬁts through an external eﬀect from the growth of .
() Public equity.–The number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed and the size of the representative
ﬁrm is proportional to . The purchase of new capital ( created by the consumption-
good-conversion technology at the cost of  per unit and  by a purchase from the
private-equity funds at the price of  per unit) is ﬁnanced by a withdrawal of ( + )
from the ﬁrm’s earnings. This reduces dividends but leads to exactly oﬀsetting capital
gains because the new capital is valued at  p e ru n i ta sl o n ga s()  0 in equilibrium
for all .7 Thus the dividends of the public-equity fund are  regardless of its
investment activity and the price per share is .




0 +  =(  + ) +(  + )
where  is the number of units of capital of the representative ﬁrm that the household
owns and  = . In equilibrium  =  =1 . As in Lucas (1978), we substitute
then be a constant, depending neither on  nor on  and would solve the equation
0 ()=1 .B u t would still be decreasing in .
7This ensures that the economy is never at a zero- corner where  could be less
than the reproduction cost as was the case in Sargent (1980).
10these conditions into the budget constraint. The resulting public-equity price per










and the private-equity price is









The multiplicative factor (1 −  + )=0 in (9) corrects for the growth of the
capital stock to which prices and dividends are proportional. It is absent from (8)
because the capital gains it implies are oﬀset exactly by the cost of investment.
Analysis.–Since utility is homothetic and returns are constant, the solution is of
the form  = (). Moreover, we derive the following solutions in Appendix C:
Proposition 1 (homogeneous x). Constants 0 and 0 are deﬁned in (19)
and (20), such that in state ()
 =








 =( 1−  + ) (12)
Recall that the magnitudes given in (10)-(12) are all relative to .A tt h i sp o i n t
we note the following:
1. Using (11) and (3), we can solve for  =  − .
2. Income is consumed or invested, i.e., + = +, and the marginal propensity








4. Wealth is  +  =[ 1+( 1−  + [])], so that it depends positively on 
and  the latter eﬀect working through the rise in capital accumulation that
an increase in  causes.
5. Formulas (10)-(12) are valid iﬀ in every state  +  ≤  +  ⇐⇒  + ()  
114 Fitting the model to data







for  ≥ 0  0 and 1.T h e nf o r
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The series .–In our model,  is driven by hidden implementation costs. When
we come to the data, this will mean that  represents a shock relative to the price of
capital that the BLS measures and uses to construct its estimated stock of capital.
Therefore measured  equals the model’s  When compatibility problems cause
reproduction costs of incumbents to rise, this will not enter their book values (i.e.,
the denominator of measured ), and this generates a measurement error that raises
measured . The model normalizes the measured cost of capital to unity, which
means that we implicitly assume that the price index for capital goods is correctly
used by the BLS when constructing the capital stock numbers that we shall use here.
The series .–We compute it as − IPO = 
The series  .–IPO values relative to the capital stock are interpreted as  This
is the value of the composite capital stock brought into the stock market. Division
by  yields 
Calculating .–Since output is ,w em e a s u r e by the ratio of private output
o v e rt h ec o u r s eo fag i v e ny e a rt op r i v a t ec a p i t a la tt h es t a r to ft h a ty e a r .T h a ti s ,
 =  for all .
Calculating .–For , we use the ratio of market-to-book values of tangible capital
in the entire non-ﬁnancial corporate sector.8
Of the six parameters, one is not identiﬁed — our data identify only the product


0, and not  and 0 separately, and so we chose 0 =1 max  so that the economy
always has a marginal new project, even at the highest sample value of . The discount
factor  was ﬁxed at 0.95 Then the algorithm ﬁrst chooses () to ﬁtt h e series.
In view of (14), this does not involve other parameters. With () thus obtained, the
algorithm then chooses () to ﬁt the long-run growth of output (given by ¯ +¯ −)
per head of 1.5 percent, and to explain as much as possible of the variation in  and
.9 Table 3 reports the parameter values.
8See Appendix A for descriptions of the data used in the simulation.
9Simulation requires that we solve for the constant ,w h i c hc a no n l yb ed o n e
numerically. To obtain estimates of  =3 26 and  =0 0034,w eﬁtted a bivariate
log-normal distribution of () to the data and then used this distribution in (19)
and (20) to solve for  and .
12Table 3. Parameter Values Used in Simulation
parameter value comment

























0 0.3 equated to 1max ()
The resulting ﬁt of the model is in Figure 3, and the time series for () is given
in Figure 4.10
The early years of the Great Depression feature an extremely low  and the
constraint  ≥ 0 is violated during the period 1931-34. This period includes extreme
events under which (8) holds as an inequality, as in Sargent (1980). But under the
estimated  (), the violation occurs very rarely, namely one-third of a percent of the
time. If we did impose non-negativity of  in all dates we believe that the optimal
solution (which we then can no longer solve explicitly) would remain very close to that
given by (10) and (11). In its desire to avoid excessive variation in , the curvature
parameter  is estimated to be very large. As  → 0 it becomes impossible for the
condition to hold in the face of even moderate variation in .
5 Comparison to the one-investment model
In a one-investment model, the income identity would read
 +  = 
In our model it reads
 +  =  + 
where  is given in (4). The parameters determining  are  and (·). A neutral
rise in the ﬂow of ideas is simply a rise in .I tr a i s e s in (4) and this is a positive
wealth eﬀect on current and future consumption. From (19) it is easy to see that 
is decreasing in  which means in (10) that
()

 0 all () (15)
The eﬀect on  cannot be signed.
10The correlations are ( ) =0 . 2 4 3 ,( −1) = 0.762 and ( −1) = .861.













Figure 3: The y and x series and their simulated values, 1901-2005.











Figure 4: The two shocks, 1901-2005




















-1 (right scale) 
Figure 5: The model economy with =0.28 and with =0, 1901-2005.
We now simulate  and  for the economy with the parameters as in Table 3,
followed by a simulation of  and  for an economy with all its parameters unchanged
except that now  =0 . Figure 5 reports the percentage increase in  and  that the
increase in  from zero to 0028 brings about. As (15) implies, consumption rises
uniformly, on average by four ﬁfths of one percent. The percentage eﬀect on  is on
average larger — about three percent — but it is non-monotonic, being negative in
periods when  is low.
In short, the presence of  has a larger cyclical consequence on  than it has on 
— the latter rises in all states ().A sf o r, the presence of  plays a smoothing role.
I.e., the new-project margin induces a smaller decline in aggregate investment when
 rises, which is not surprising since the new-project sector is immune to the adverse
implementation-cost shock. The net result is a smoother investment series than we
would see if the  investment were not present.
6 Heterogeneity in continuing-project investments
We now show the results are robust to adding heterogeneity in . So far we assumed
that all continuing projects could augment their capital at a unit cost of . Suppose,
instead that continuing projects are heterogeneous. Suppose that each project delivers
a unit of capital tomorrow, but that the cost,  is project-speciﬁc, and suppose that
15Figure 6: The effect of heterogeneous  projects.
the distribution of  is Pareto:







;  ≥ 
(16)
The parameter  is an index of heterogeneity of continuing projects. As  → 0 we
get the homogeneous case in which on continuing-projects, each unit of capital costs
. But the equilibrium price of shares, call it ˆ ,n o wd e p e n d so n and  and we do
not have an analytic solution for it, but the Appendix proves the following result:
Proposition 2 (heterogeneous x). When (16) holds, the income identity reads
 =  + ()+
Ã

















→  so that (17) becomes the same as (5). And the
price of shares, ˆ ,c o n v e r g e st o for all ().
16Figure 6 shows a simulated version of Figure 3, and then add two supply curves
for  covering the case 0, each pertaining to a hypothetical realization of the
shock .W h e n 0 one must distinguish ˆ  from , and so the vertical axis now
measures ˆ  and the curves (ˆ ) and (ˆ ) both are represented as functions of this
variable, although the functional forms are taken from (10) and (11) so that they are
correct only for the case  =0  The curve (ˆ ) plots (11) evaluated at the sample
mean value  =0 36. The supply of new projects (ˆ ). We draw the supply curve
for  for  ∈ {12} and for  ∈ {02}. We also plot the supply of new projects ()
from (14) at the values of 0 ,a n d given in Table 1.
We must distinguish the price of capital, ˆ ,f r o mt h es h o c k. N o t et h a ta t
 =2 , the variance in the distribution of the costs of continuing projects is inﬁnite,







=1 56. Thus the supply
of continuing projects is more elastic not because their entire population is more
homogenous but, rather, because there are far fewer new projects (measuring in total
 =0 025) than continuing projects (measuring unity in total), so that among the
implemented new projects the variance is larger.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have documented an asymmetry in the response of investment to aggregate :
Small and young ﬁrms respond positively to it, while large and old ﬁrms respond
negatively. We argue that this occurs because a high  is a signal of low compatibility
of old capital with the new and, hence, of high implementation costs speciﬁct o
incumbents alone. Entrants do not face compatibility problems because they start de
novo, and raise their investment when the cost is high.
Introducing the second, new-project margin into a one-investment model dampens
the time-series variation in investment, raising investment in states when the imple-
mentation cost is high and lowering it in states when the cost is low. There seems to
be little or no eﬀect on consumption variation.
Finally, variations in the implementation cost are driven by technological change.
On this view, aggregate stock-price volatility is caused by technological change, a
property that our model shares with other models that feature shocks to the cost of
investment.
8 Appendix A. Data and Methods
In this appendix we document the data sources and methods used to construct the
s e r i e sd e p i c t e di no u rﬁgures and included in the empirical analysis.
Figure 1.–The investment rate of an individual ﬁrm (i.e., (()) is its annual
expenditures on property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item 30) as a percentage
17of its total assets at the start of the year (item 6). We compute the ﬁrm-speciﬁc 
using year-end data from Compustat.T h e n u m e r a t o r o f  is the value of a ﬁrm’s
common equity at current share prices (the product of Compustat items 24 and 25),
to which we add the book values of preferred stock (item 130) and of long and short-
term debt (items 9 and 34). We use book values of preferred stock and debt in the
numerator because prices of preferred stocks are not available from Compustat and we
do not have information on issue dates for debt from which we might better estimate
market value. Book values of these components are reasonable approximations of
market values so long as interest rates do not vary excessively. The denominator of 
i sc o m p u t e di nt h es a m ew a ye x c e p tt h a tb o o kv a l u eo fc o m m o ne q u i t y( Compustat
item 60) is used in place of market value. Our micro-based  measures thus focus on
the value of a ﬁrm’s outstanding securities and implicitly assume that the proceeds of
these issues are fully applied to the formation of capital, both physical and intangible.
Figure 3.–To construct the  series shown in the upper panel of Figure 3, we
b e g i nw i t ht h ev a l u eo fI P O sa sap r o x yf o rt h en u m e r a t o r ,.T h i si sm e a s u r e da s
the aggregate year-end market value of the common stock of all ﬁrms that enter the
University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) ﬁles in each
year from 1925 through 2005, excluding American Depository Receipts. The CRSP
ﬁles include listings only from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1925 until
1961, with American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ ﬁrms joining in 1962 and 1972
respectively. This generates large entry rates in 1962 and 1972 that for the most part
do not reﬂect initial public oﬀerings. Because of this, we linearly interpolate between
entry rates in 1961 and 1963 and between 1971 and 1973, and assign these values to
the years 1962 and 1972 respectively. For 1901-1924 we obtain market values of ﬁrms
that list for the ﬁrst time on the NYSE using our pre-CRSP database of stock prices,
par values, and book capitalizations that we collected for all common stocks traded on
the NYSE using the The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Bradstreet’s, The New
York Times,a n dThe Annalist (see Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001). We measure the
denominator, −1, as the previous end-of-year stock of private ﬁxed assets from the
BEA (2006, Table 6.1, line 1) for 1925 through 2005. For 1900-1924, we use annual
estimates from Goldsmith (1955, Vol. 3, Tab l eW - 1 ,c o l .2 ,p p .1 4 - 1 5 )t h a ti n c l u d e
reproducible, tangible assets (i.e., structures, equipment, and inventories), and then
subtract government structures (col. 3), public inventories (col. 17), and monetary
gold and silver (col. 18). We then join the result with the BEA series and divide by
aggregate  (described below).
To construct the  series shown in the lower panel of Figure 3, we measure
the numerator, , as annual gross private domestic investment from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA 2006, Table 5.2.5, line 4) for 1929-2005, to which we join
estimates from Kendrick (1961, Table A-IIb, column 5, pp. 296-7) for 1901-1928. We
then divide the result by −1.
Figure 4.–For , we use private output, deﬁned as GDP less government expen-
ditures on consumption and investment from the BEA (2006) for 1929-2005, to which
18we join Kendrick’s (1961, Table A-IIb, pp. 296-7, col. 11) estimates of gross national
product less government for 1901-2005. We then divide the result by −1.
For aggregate , we use fourth quarter observations underlying Hall (2001) for
1950-99, and then join them with estimates underlying Abel and Eberly (2008) for
1999 to 2005. These authors derive aggregate Tobin’s  from the Federal Reserve
Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts as the ratio of market-to-book values for tangible
assets in the entire non-ﬁnancial corporate sector. We then bring the aggregate 
series back to 1901 by ratio splicing the “equity ” measure underlying Wright (2004).
Hall’s measure of  exceeds Wright’s by factor of more than 1.5 in 1950, when the
splice occurs, producing ’s before 1950 that are considerably higher than Wright’s
published estimates. We also note that these measures of aggregate  are generally
smaller than the ones that we constructed for 1962 through 2006 as averages of ﬁrm-
level data for use in our regression analysis. The diﬀerence arises for two reasons.
First, since Compustat and our backward extension only cover ﬁrms that are listed
on organized stock exchanges, the micro-based sample is focused on larger and more
successful ﬁrms. Second, our micro-based measure of  is based on market and book
values of a ﬁrm’s outstanding securities issues (see notes for Figure 1), the proceeds
of which are spent on physical capital and intangibles. Since intangibles probably
form an important part of the forward-looking component of stock prices, we might
expect our micro-based measures of  to exceed those based upon tangibles alone.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,o u rm i c r oa n dm a c r oseries are highly correlated, with  =0 . 9 2i n
their period of overlap (i.e., 1962-2005).
9 Appendix B. Robustness of Results in Figure 1
In this appendix we show the robustness of the regressions in Figure 1 to the inclusion
of ﬁxed eﬀects for years and two-digit SIC industries, as well as to estimation with
GMM using higher-order moments. Table B.1 includes several regressions that are
similar to the one depicted in the left panel of Figure 1. We continue to use OLS in
the left panel of Table B.1 so that the ﬁrst column simply repeats the result shown
in left panel of Figure 1. In the second column we add ﬁxed eﬀe c t sf o ry e a r st ot h e
speciﬁcation, and we include ﬁxed eﬀects for two-digit SIC industries in addition to
the year eﬀects in the third column. All three regressions show a positive relation
between a ﬁrm’s own  and its subsequent investment.
Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) propose a method for estimating investment
regressions that yields consistency in the presence of measurement error in .T h e
technique uses higher-order moments of the −1 as instruments for −1.W e
estimated these models using the third, fourth, and ﬁfth moments as instruments in
the center panel of Table B.1 and using the third through sixth moments in the right
panel. In all cases the coeﬃcients on −1 are even larger than those obtained with
OLS and remain positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
19Table B.1. Q-Regressions for Domestic Investment, 1962-2006
Dependent variable: log of investment as percentage of capital at start of year
OLS GMM5 GMM6
−1 0.014 0.022 0.012 0.174 0.140 0.134 0.131 0.112 0.115
(6.80) (7.33) (6.42) (4.58) (4.67) (4.32) (10.9) (10.2) (8.85)
2-digit SIC no no yes no no yes no no yes
eﬀects
year eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
2 .005 .827 .850 .065 .852 .856 .051 .850 .855
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. There are 160,580
o b s e r v a t i o n si n c l u d e di ne a c hr e g r e s s i o n .
Table B.2. Aggregate Q-Regressions for Domestic Investment, 1962-2006
Dependent variable: log of investment as percentage of capital at start of year
OLS GMM5 GMM6
−1 -0.082 -0.135 -2.822 -2.330 -2.297 -1.618
(20.5) (33.8) (20.2) (21.6) (21.9) (21.3)
2-digit SIC no yes no no no no
industry eﬀects
2 .002 .844 .027 .859 .031 .854
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. There are
160,580 observations included in each regression.
Table B.2 presents a set of regressions that explore the robustness of the result in
the right panel of Figure 1 to alternative speciﬁcations and estimation with higher-
order moments. The negative relation between and investment and aggregate −1
persists in all of these variations, with the estimated -elasticity once again stronger
when estimated with GMM.
Table B.3 shows the mapping from three-digit SICs into the 69 sectors deﬁned by




Table B.3. SIC Composition of the Five Broadly Defined Sectors in Table 1                                                                                        
 
Broad Sector    Corresponding SIC 3-Digit Industries 
1-Business and industrial  267-Converted paper and paperboard products, except containers and boxes 
   273-Books 
ThomsonVC Industries 275-Commercial  printing 
11-Chemicals and materials  282-Plastics materials and synthetic resins, synthetic rubber, cellulo 
40-Industrial equipment  287-Agricultural chemicals 
41-Industrial products (other)  289-Misc. chemical products 
42-Industrial services   308-Misc. plastics products 
50-Manufacturing    329-Abrasive, asbestos, and misc. non-metallic mineral products 
    331-Steel works, blast furnaces (including coke ovens), and rolling mills 
    335-Rolling, drawing, and extruding of nonferrous metals 
    353-Construction, mining, and materials handling machinery and equipment 
    354-Metal working machinery and equipment 
    355-Special industrial machinery, except metalworking machinery 
    357-Computer and office equipment 
    358-Refrigeration and service industry machinery 
    359-Misc. industrial and commercial machinery and equipment 
   362-Electrical  industrial  apparatus 
    367-Electronic components and accessories   
    371-Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 
    382-Lab apparatus and analytical, optical, measuring and controlling devices 
    441-Deep sea foreign transportation of freight 
   495-Sanitary  services 
    873-Research, development, and testing services 
 
 
Broad Sector    Corresponding SIC 3-Digit Industries 
2-Biotech and healthcare  281-Industrial inorganic chemicals 
    282-Plastics materials and synthetic resins, synthetic rubber, cellulo 
ThomsonVC Industries 283-Drugs 
03-Biosensors   287-Agricultural  chemicals 
04-Biotech equipment   382-Lab apparatus and analytical, optical, measuring and controlling devices 
05-Biotech other    384-Surgical, medical, and dental instruments and supplies 
06-Biotech research    801-Offices and clinics of doctors of medicine 
07-Biotech animal    806-Hospitals 
08-Biotech human    809-Misc. health and allied services 








Broad Sector    Corresponding SIC 3-Digit Industries 
3-Energy      131-Crude petroleum and natural gas 
      138-Oil and gas field services 
ThomsonVC Industries  343-Heating equipment, except electric and warm air; plumbing fixtures 
29-Energy, alternative   344-Fabricated structural metal products 
30-Energy, coal    353-Construction, mining, and materials handling machinery and equipment 
31-Energy, conservation  367-Electronic components and accessories 22 
 
32-Energy, enhanced recovery  382-Lab apparatus and analytical, optical, measuring and controlling devices 
33-Energy, other    491-Electrical services 
55-Oil and gas exploration  492-Gas production and distribution 
59-Pollution and recycling  495-Sanitary services 
68-Utilities  753-Automotive  repair  shops 
      871-Engineering, architectural, and surveying services 
   873-Research,  development,  and  testing  services 
 
 
Broad Sector    Corresponding SIC 3-Digit Industries 
4-Communications and   335-Rolling, drawing, and extruding of nonferrous metals   
    electronics    355-Special industry machinery, except metalworking machinery 
   357-Computer  and  office  equipment 
Thomson VC Industries  359-Misc. industrial and commercial machinery and equipment 
02-Batteries   362-Electrical  industrial  apparatus 
12-Communications, other  366-Communications equipment 
24-Data communications  367-Electronic components and accessories 
27-Electronics equipment  369-Misc. electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies 
28-Electronics, other    381-Search, detection, navigation, guidance, aeronautical, and nautical 
35-Facsimile transmission  382-Lab apparatus and analytical, optical, measuring, and controlling devices 
36-Fiber optics    386-Photographic equipment and supplies 
39-Industrial automation  481-Telephone communications 
56-Optoelectronics    737-Computer programming, data processing, and other computer-related 
60-Power supplies    871-Engineering, architectural, and surveying services 
62-Satellite communication 





Broad Sector    Corresponding SIC 3-Digit Industries 
5-Internet and computers  357-Computer and office equipment 
      367-Electronic components and accessories 
Thomson VC Industries 393-Musical  instruments 
14-Computer, other    481-Telephone communications 
15-Computer peripherals  731-Advertising 
16-Computer programming  737-Computer programming, data processing, and other computer related 
17-Computer services   738-Misc. business services 
18-Computer software 
19-Computer hardware 








67-Turnkey integrated systems and solutions10 Appendix C: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :W ed e ﬁne two constants for which no explicit solution
exists but conditional on which we fully characterize consumption and the two in-
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 (19)
and the second is deﬁn e di nt e r m so f where  i sa l s ok n o w nu pt ot h ep a r a m e t e r
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i.e., (10) Then  = 1
 ( +  − )=1
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23In (9), we substitute [1 −  + (0)]0 for (),w h i c hl e a d st o
()
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which, together with (10), leads to (20).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : When projects with  ∈ [0max] are implemented, the







Now, when the marginal project just breaks even, max =ˆ , and we have (18). Solving
(21) for the marginal project yields
max = (1 − )
−  (22)
Letting  () denote the unnormalized C.D.F. deﬁned in (16), the cost of ,p e r













































Since the cost is in units of today’s goods, this implies (17).
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